After our discussion of Kant’s ideas concerning the moral right to lie, we were all left with a lingering feeling of discomfort; according to Kant, we should all lead a murderer to a friend, no matter the later consequences. It is very difficult for me to justify following an ideal moral code (i.e., telling the truth in any situation) when the almost sure consequence of my action would be the death of my friend. So, do we need special principles for dealing with evil?
We are told that lying, generally speaking, is considered a wrong action. Lying is a violation of a perfect duty to oneself, and moreover, a liar can be held legally and ethically responsible for his actions. We also must remember that lies are only successful in achieving their purpose because they act to deceive. But if they were universally practiced, they would not deceive. Lies, though, are deceptive because most people do not engage in them, and they can only be performed by someone who makes an exception of himself.
As we apply this immoral action to the case of the murderer at the door, we could also consider that even before the main subject is faced with the decision to deceive or not to deceive, deception has already occurred. Murderers do not standardly knock on doors proclaiming, “I wish to murder your friend. Is he in the house?”. Most murderers, I would assume, suppose that a person does not know 1. who he is, and 2. what he has in mind. The murderer, or the deceiver, has placed himself in an immoral position. If these are the circumstances, could there be a universal practice of lying to a deceiver? Is it allowed to lie to deceivers in order to counteract the intended results of their deception?
If everything I just said is completely convoluted, here’s more food for thought: What else could a person do, if they follow Kant’s laws and tell the truth? Hypothetically, would they have a moral obligation to follow the murderer and, if he attempts to murder his friend, to stop him by using force? Or would this be just as immoral?
I totally agree with you that it is very hard to detatch oneself from the situation of handing over your friend to a murderer because that is exactly how we view telling the murderer the truth. We see this truth telling as incredibly incriminating because by telling the murderer that yes your friend is in your house you are practically enabling him or her to kill your friend. However, Kant looks at this situation and sees that the only way for you to remain completely irresponsible for the death of anyone is to tell the truth. I have a really hard time wrapping my head around the idea that telling the truth to a murderer which could potentially lead to their death does not make you responsible for what happens to them. It is certainly a difficult situation either way
ReplyDeleteI'm definitely still not completely sure where I stand on this topic. When we were discussing in class whether or not it was moral or immoral to lie to a killer, I kept thinking that there's no way Kant could find a way to rationalize those actions. However, using Kant's reasoning we still arrived at the general conclusion that he would say it is immoral to lie because you cannot will all rational beings to lie. But, I thought something was flawed in this mentality. Rather than be willing a lie, wouldn't the rational being be willing that his friend stay alive? The lie is a consequence of the will which, as we've learned, Kant is not concerned with. So this is the position I hold. Using Kant's reasoning, the willing that my friend stay alive is a good will, the lie is a consequence. I would definitely lie.
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